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The forensic investigation of hoax, suspected or actual biological weapons attacks, and
bioproliferation activities is recognized by biosecurity-advanced nations as an important
pillar in a national biosecurity program. Some nations have taken this seriously; most
others have not or are not aware of the potential. When law enforcement and forensic
science investigations are performed in a coordinated manner, decisions assigning
attribution are informed and accountability is supported through legal and policy decisions
and actions. Incorporating public health investigative and tailored scientific assets makes
the system even more effective, dynamic, and robust. Perpetrators and enablers must
be held at risk of being brought to justice, or through a policy decision resulting in
direct action being taken or sanctions imposed. This paper provides a foundation and
path forward to establish substantially expanded capability founded on establishing and
leveraging national and regional programs and international agreement that attribution
is an important component of biosecurity. Specific forward-looking initiatives will be
recommended and discussed.
Keywords: attribution, global biosecurity, investigation, microbial forensics, law enforcement, public health,
decision making
Introduction
An effective and agile investigative capability supported by science, other complementary technical
support, and information sharing, is an essential aspect of any national biosecurity program
as well as global biosecurity (Murch, 2001, 2003, 2011a,b, 2014; Budowle et al., 2003; Bush,
2004; Obama, 2009). Those that perpetrate bioterrorism and bioproliferation must be held at
risk for legal prosecution or actions taken as a result of policy decisions. Getting caught and
being held accountable, or the credible threat thereof, “raises the bar” for those who engage
illicit activities related to biowarfare, bioterrorism, or bioproliferation. The greater the belief of
and risk to adversaries that they will be identified, apprehended, and prosecuted either through
legal or policy decisions, the more likely this will be factored in the decisions and choices
they make.
Greater global cooperation should be established in this arena. Nations could establish tailored
programs or cooperate in regional consortia to share benefits and costs, or a sufficient number of
countries could to provide adequate coverage for the rest as needed. If this vision is embraced, the
first step toward the goal of a more robust global investigation and attribution capability would be
specific efforts for building cooperation, engineering consensus, and cooperation on investigative
capabilities, legal requirements, and scientific collaborations.
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There is no one program that can provide an impervious
biodefense or biosecurity. However, a well-crafted “kit of tools,”
which effectively enhances anticipation, prevention, prepared-
ness, response, recovery, and attribution can provide a defense
system, which “raises the bar” for adversaries and those who assist
them. Investigation and attribution are sometimes forgotten as
important tools in the kit. This paper focuses on the latter, specif-
ically investigation toward attribution, and argues that substantial
expansion of attribution-informing programs would significantly
improve biosecurity at a global scale.
Background
In the United States and other countries, bioterrorism risk mit-
igation, preparedness, and response are reliant on a number of
complementary and layered biosecurity and biodefense programs.
In the U.S., this has included developing and stockpiling advanced
medical countermeasures, improving emergency response, foster-
ing responsible science, and ensuring safe and secure research in
several hundred higher level biosafety level (BSL) laboratories.
Singly or taken together, these are not a perfect solution against
criminal and terrorist acts. Insider personnel threats, misuse of
science, misappropriation of source materials, the threat, inten-
tion and acquisition, development, test and use of dangerous
pathogens and toxins as weapons by non-state and state actors,
and even false threats, must still be taken seriously. Those mea-
sures, which increase the likelihood that those who conduct illegal
activities will be held at risk of legal or policy action, are also
necessary.
At the core of such a “whole of government” investigative
response also is the collaborative relationship between public
health and law enforcement for executing concomitant public
health and criminal investigations (Goodman et al., 2003). Such
a program has existed in the U.S. since 1970s, but since 1996 was
greatly strengthened and expanded and has provided value almost
many cases and events. Since then, the program has undergone
considerable expansion with respect to advancing investigative
and scientific capabilities, expanding the organizations involved
and involvement of policy in addition to criminal justice and
law. Since that time, some other countries have created their
own programs (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009, 2010; Govern-
ment Offices of Sweden, 2011; Public Health Agency of Canada,
2015) including sometimes benefiting from engagement with the
U.S. From these early efforts in the U.S., the field of micro-
bial forensics was born, which has since become a recognized
subdiscipline of microbiology at the intersection with forensic
science.
In the years prior to the U.S. program’s creation, laws were
enacted to enhance the prosecution of the unauthorized posses-
sion, development, or use of biological weapons and toxins, which
enabled investigation and prosecution (United States Code, 1989).
The investigations of the anthrax attacks of 2001 (Murch, 2011b)
were complex, frustrating to many, sometimes seemingly politi-
cally driven, and not fully enabled with all the tools required for
rapid resolution. However, the fact that reasonably mature inves-
tigative capabilities, some existing analytic methods and emerging
scientific resources at the time (National Research Council, 2011),
and established legal instruments were in place enabled the inves-
tigations toward the prosecution (United States Department of
Justice, 2010). The technical investigative capabilities have since
advanced further (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2015).
A global BW investigative and forensic program may not pre-
cisely mirror the program of any one country. However, much
could be learned and leveraged from existing programs to estab-
lish a robust system of aptly sized and tailored national and
regional capabilities, which provide global coverage.
Context
There are a several key components of a bioterror-
ism–bioproliferation forensics and attribution program that
the reader should become familiar with.
Law Enforcement Investigation
Law enforcement investigation pertains to the application of
resources under legal authority, which results in the determina-
tion that an event of interest (i.e., criminal) has occurred, follows
a logical and defensible path to identifying those responsible
(“attribution”), and their methods, means, and motives, and pro-
vides a prosecutable case based on admissible evidence, ideally
through equitable legal process and decisionmaking. These inves-
tigations support actions through criminal justice systems (e.g.,
prosecutions).
Attribution
Attribution in the legal and policy contexts refer to “who did
it.” Attribution is informed by investigative, scientific, and other
information and is a qualitative judgment by the appropriate
authority. The “attribution decision” precedes further decision
making with respect to what, if any, actions to take as a result
of the type and impact of the events at issue. Legal attribu-
tion decisions can use existing decision frameworks, but with
policy decisions, at least in the U.S., such does not exist. Exon-
eration is considered to be equally important. Scientific attri-
bution is taken to mean “assignment of a sample of questioned
origin to a source of known origin to a high degree of sci-
entific certainty (at the same time excluding origination from
other sources). The scientific analytical and interpretive activ-
ities, which seek scientific attribution, inform legal and policy
questions that can lead to identifying perpetrators and enablers.
Depending on the type and quality of the forensic evidence and
what it is capable of providing, the science can be very infor-
mative, definitive, and buttress either the case of prosecution
(seeking conviction and punishment) or defense (exoneration,
acquittal).
Public Health Investigation
Public health investigation is the process that health authori-
ties undertake in response to a disease outbreak to identify the
causative agent, source, and spread of the outbreak to minimize
its effects. From the biosecurity perspective, resolving with high
confidence whether or not the outbreak manifested as a result of
a natural, accidental, or deliberate event is crucial. This is also the
nexus of the relationship between public health and law enforce-
ment; and neither can resolve the origination of the outbreak
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without the other. Public health seeks to protect the health and
safety of the public. Law enforcement seeks to protect the public
by preventing, interdicting, mitigating, responding to, and bring
resolution to criminal (and terrorist) acts. The approaches and
science used by both domains are similar, though for different
purposes.
Forensic Science
Forensic science can be defined as “the analysis and interpreta-
tion of physical evidence to determine its relevance to criminal
motives, intentions, plans, events, persons of interest and perpe-
trators, places of interest including scenes of crime, and means to
include tools, methods, and processes.” Forensic science includes
the proper collection, preservation, transport, storage, analysis,
interpretation and reporting of evidence, and the required admin-
istration, security, and qualitymanagement. Classical forensic dis-
ciplines include pattern analysis (e.g., fingerprint), biology (e.g.,
human DNA analysis), trace evidence (e.g., hairs and fibers),
toxicology (i.e., drugs and poisons), digital evidence (e.g., com-
puter media), and pathology (i.e., manner and cause of death).
Validated techniques, methods, and protocols, which meet or
exceed both scientific and legal standards, are required. In the
U.S. and elsewhere, some forensic science is being called into
question because the science and claims about it have been found
to be weak, unsupported, overstated, and applied by those without
proper credentials (National Research Council, 2009). Hence, in
at least the U.S., there is pressing interest for improvements to
many areas of forensic science and practice and its use in legal
processes.
Microbial Forensics
Microbial forensics is defined as “the development and applica-
tion of forensic science and necessary sciences to investigative
problems involving biological threat agents, their by-products
(toxins), and associated physical evidence.” In essence, microbial
forensics seeks to help answer: “What was the agent used and its
source? How was it prepared and disseminated? Where and how
did the illicit activity take place? Who was involved?” Microbial
forensics leverages a host of other basic and applied sciences that
are not common to traditional forensic sciences; e.g., microbi-
ology, microbial ecology, public health epidemiology, microbial
genomics, and bioinformatics, toxicology, and process engineer-
ing. Microbial forensics incorporates the investigative, forensic,
and legal perspectives and requirements to answer relevant inves-
tigative and legal questions. Leaders in microbial forensics are
very mindful of these issues and activities to improve forensic
science broadly. It requires specialized expertise, training, equip-
ment, and instrumentation, and facilities, which are more akin
to public health and infectious disease laboratories, but also with
the capacity to exploit physical evidence for classical purposes
that is or could be contaminated with hazardous materials. Since
its origins, microbial forensics has evolved considerably based on
new science, and the experience garnered from prior events such
as the anthrax mailing attacks in the U.S. in 2001 (Breeze et al.,
2005; Budowle et al., 2010; Cliff et al., 2012; National Research
Council, 2014). The best quality of science that meets or exceeds
scientific and legal standards or policy expectations is sought
(Budowle et al., 2008;Murch and Bahr, 2010), even with advanced
technologies (Budowle et al., 2014).
Preparing and Integrating Essential
Elements for Effective Programs
The design, development, validation, establishment, and exercis-
ing of capabilities should occur before they are needed. During
a crisis, poor planning and preparation will likely result in poor
performance, complications resulting in delays, bad outcomes, or
even overall failure. Much of this can be avoided by initially con-
ducting a thorough and objective assessment of what capabilities
exist and what is needed, and then laying out and acting on a
plan to get the current state to the desired state in a rational, cost-
effective manner. Awareness training for and exercising by key
legal and policy offices should be provided in advance tominimize
impedances on operations and decision making.
Key components are:
Properly Staffed Teams, Coordinated Investigation, Information
Access, Analysis, and Sharing: Law enforcement and pub-
lic health investigative teams require individuals that possess
strong professional credentials and experience in their respective
professions and disciplines, and experience in complex investi-
gations, including joint investigations. These teams should have
established and tested investigative protocols; coordination and
cross communication between the respective teams, respective
lines of command, control and communication, and protocols
for engagement with key stakeholders; and, all necessary on-
demand information and knowledge resources.
Technical Forensic Capabilities: Forensic hazardous materials
(hazmat) sampling and contaminated traditional evidence col-
lection must occur in an effective, safe, and secure manner.
Evidence must be packaged, documented, and transported in
an appropriate manner to maintain the chain of custody and
evidence integrity. Necessary equipment and logistics must be
available and used to meet regulations for hazmat transport.
Fully equipped and configured laboratories staffed by the appro-
priately educated and certified personnel should be available
to conduct required analyses using validated methods under a
comprehensive quality program. These experts render the accu-
rate and defensible reports and opinions that answer or inform
priority investigative, forensic, legal, and policy questions.
Legal Process andDecisionMaking:Lawsmust be in place to allow
the prosecution and punishment of illegitimate acquisition,
development, use, and proliferation of dangerous pathogens and
toxins. Further, the criminal jurisprudence system of a country
must be able to recognize, react to, and resolve violations of
law. Given that cases involving dangerous pathogens and toxins
have a number of complexities and uncertainties to contend
with, lawyers and judges must be aware of these and understand
how the law and legal procedure applies. In some countries, this
extends to complex science that must be applied, interpreted,
and reported, which then must be conveyed in the language
and logic of the courts to inform decisions, including those
of guilt or innocence. Forensic experts must be trained to and
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communicate complex science in an understandable, relevant
manner, and ensure that decision makers understand the value,
weight, attributes, limitations, and uncertainties of the science
and practice.
Policy Process and DecisionMaking: Policy formulation and deci-
sion making is different than the legal process, though it may be
influenced by law as well as politics. That said, the investigation,
and particularly the supportive scientific activities conducted
should be thorough, timely, objective, informative, and defen-
sible with the understanding that policy makers will consider
and act on what is provided as they see fit. In keeping with good
science and professional integrity, nevertheless, policy makers,
and politicians should be provided relevant, complete, accu-
rate, reliable, testable, defensible information, and conclusions
from the technical experts to use in deliberations and decision
making.
Moving Forward: Building the Base toward
Broad Implementation
The following are key steps that, if undertaken, would move
nations, regions, and perhaps our global society toward and to
the goal of a coherent investigative, technical, legal, and policy
enterprise for bioattribution.
Recommendation 1: Increasing Awareness and
Engagement
Regional security cooperation conferences should be convened,
which include engaging the international law, diplomatic, policy,
technical and investigative communities on the attribution of
biological warfare, bioterrorism, and bioproliferation. The foci of
these meetings would be to provide awareness and education, and
allow for structured discussions on investigative priorities and
processes, interagency coordination, technical aspects, and deci-
sion making. Participants would consider: (a) the importance of
and current and desired capabilities to properly investigate suspi-
cious disease outbreaks; (b) whether having an improved capacity
to investigate and inform decision making should be a priority;
and (c) if the answers to the first two sets indicate positive interest,
then howbest to organize, resource, evolve, and sustain the desired
capability either within country, as a regional construct or through
outsourcing it. Tabletop exercises would be an excellent method
to immerse participants in applying the knowledge that they have
gained to quickly gain a deeper understanding. Discussions on
national and international legal and policy requirements to declare
attribution and to support actions could also take place. Joint
statements of need or draft agreements and “paths forward” could
also result from such meetings.
Recommendation 2: Country Assessments to
Inform Investments
Using external or indigenous experts “country assessments” could
be performed using a tailored “systems analysis” approach. The
requestor would articulate what they seek to establish in a pre-
scribed format. A team of vetted experts in the appropriate dis-
ciplines would help to objectively determine what exists, what
is needed, how to, and what is required to achieve the desired
state and the timeline. The results and recommendations would
be provided to the requestor for consideration and action. The
experts assisting could be available as reachback support.
Recommendation 3: Integrated Training and
Cross-Community Exercises
Various types and levels of training could be provided to request-
ing nations based on need, existing capacity, available resources,
and desired end-state. Based on prior analysis, the training for
each requesting country would also seek to facilitate the inte-
gration of law enforcement and public health investigation and
their respective scientific and technical elements, and criminal
justice and policy stakeholders. Tabletop or field exercises would
be executed to assist in the requesting nation with burnishing its
newly acquired knowledge or capability. The “train-the-trainer”
perspective would be embedded throughout, with reachback sup-
port available from the original training staff as needed.
Recommendation 4: Pilot (Demonstration) Efforts
At least four areas exist for which focused, limited-term projects
could be designed and executed to catalyze near- and longer-term
success.
 Deeper, hands on training for new technical capabilities
could be provided to nations that have or can quickly imple-
ment basic capabilities. More sophisticated sample collec-
tion, and advanced instrumentation and analytic methods
could be made available.
 Collaborative research by multinational teams focused on
“microbial forensics grand challenges” (National Research
Council, 2014), which would provide fundamental leaps in
knowledge and capability could be funded and pursued to
galvanize attention on these topics and contribute to sub-
stantial advancements in knowledge and technology that
would benefit microbial forensics and closely related fields.
 International agreement on establishing and accepting
guidelines and standards for the practice of microbial
forensics would be core to a confidence-building quality
management system governing laboratory operation and
performance, as it is with other fields. One of the most com-
mon bodies of standards used in forensic science is Interna-
tional Standards Organization (ISO)/IEC 17025 standards,
General Requirements for the Competence of Calibra-
tion/Testing Laboratories (International Standards Organi-
zation, 2010), against which laboratories are inspected in
order to achieve accreditation. Certification of practition-
ers, accreditation of laboratories, and validation of methods
would be three priority topics. The most widely accepted
approaches and best practices from forensic science, micro-
bial forensics, public health epidemiology, environmental
health and microbiology, food safety, and other pertinent
fields could also contribute to guidelines or standards for
bioterrorism and bioproliferation investigations. One or
more consensus reports with courses of action would result.
 Developing and testing attribution decision frameworks
would develop from structured conversations among legal
and policy experts, augmented by technical experts, that
Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology | www.frontiersin.org June 2015 | Volume 3 | Article 804
Murch Bioattribution and global biosecurity
would be the precursor to developing a global conversation
regarding what should be expected regarding the type, quality,
quantity, and value of information that is required to make an
accurate, reliable, and defensible attribution decision. Thus,
decision frameworks could be established and vetted for broad
consideration. These fora could also be leveraged for discus-
sions on bioattribution and deterrence, which have received
no serious attention.
If the above were undertaken and sustainability was deter-
mined to be advantageous, a global strategy and plan could be
developed and enterprise leadership could be established. These
could occur before or after the aforementioned recommendations
were undertaken. Other subsequent opportunities would be obvi-
ous and realized as well. Adding robust attribution capabilities will
enhance the global biosecurity regime. A more biosecure future
awaits us.
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